About 1/3 of the way through my postmodernism book, and I find it pretty fascinating. I am not having much difficulty with it at all, and I am wondering if the relative simplicity of the central arguments are a factor in the high popularity of this stance among idiots. Nevertheless, I agree so far with my intrepid guide, Christopher Butler, that while it certainly fails as a totalizing philosophy, it offers important correctives for how we sometimes see the world.

Po-mo gets the most flack for its attacks on science. Here, as an example, is Butler's account of a post-modern critique of science textbooks:

For example, there is a much referred to article by the anthropologist Emily Martin on "The Egg and the Sperm", which argues that "the picture of egg and sperm draw in popular as well as scientific accounts of reproductive biology relies on stereotypes central to our cultural definitions of male and female". "The stereotypes imply not only that female biological processes are less worthy than their male counterparts but also that women are less worthy than men". In such literature, it is asserted, we have a "passive", "coy damsel" female egg, versus the "active","macho" male sperm . . . Patriarchal scientists are supposed by their postmodernist critics to have inevitably, given their subjective and politically contaminated presuppositions, got the science of the relationship wrong.

Butler actually goes on to state that the science was indeed wrong, that the egg in effect "grabs" the sperm. But that isn't the point. The real question is whether the science was actually hampered by the political motivations of the scientists. This seems a tough argument to make since the patriarchal scientists changed their mind.

I think, in the end, where po-mo falls apart is specifically in its criticisms of science, as opposed to literature or history. Of course science is often seen through political or social lenses. But science, when done right, should only be the systematic examination of experience. This method suggests that all humans see causation in the same way. But that is obviously not true: If a tribe in Africa (po-mo alert: white superiority) believed that their rain dance caused the rain, who are we to argue?

But I want to argue that science is different because it applies rigorous examination to causation. Correlation is often not enough for scientists, and in any case I doubt correlation exists between the rain dances and actual rain. The tribe simply believes that there is causation. Are scientists any different? Hume would say no (all causation is actually habit and custom), Kant would probably say yes. The question here is obvious: how do we prove that our method (science) of finding causation is superior to the natives' method? I don't think it would be difficult to prove that the scientists would have more success at predicting rain than the natives (though not perfect), and by that standard, it can proven that science is superior to rain dances, though it's important to recognize that this superiority is tenuous at best. Science is better because it works better. Is there a way out of this better than simple pragmatism?

It is also worth noting, by observing the content of the quote up there, that postmodernists are incredibly blind to their own political stances. (Butler routinely notes the irony of their Freudian and Marxist worldview in contrast to their extreme relativism.) Po-mo itself is a political position. I would love for someone to do a postmodern critique of post-modernism!